Preliminary Material --Foreword /Samuel M. Natale --Acknowledgements /Samuel M. Natale, Brian M. Rothschild, Joseph W. Sora, and Tara M. Madden --Introduction /William O'Neill and Samuel M. Natale --Section I /Samuel M. Natale, Brian M. Rothschild, Joseph W. Sora, and Tara M. Madden --The Working Class Spirituality /Joseph M. McShane --Comparative Christian Perspectives on the Meaning of Work /Joseph W. Ford --Work, Spirituality, and the Moral Point of View /Kenneth E. Goodpaster --Can Christian Ethics Inform Business Practice?: (...) A Typological Road Map and Criteria of Adequacy for an Ethic of Capitalism /David A. Krueger --The American and Catholic Models of Worker Rights: A Comparison and Appraisal /Michael A. Zigarelli --Section II /Samuel M. Natale, Brian M. Rothschild, Joseph W. Sora, and Tara M. Madden --The Work Ethic and Notions of Character in Scottish Education /W. A. Gatherer --The Multidimensionality of Values Conflicts in the Organizational Life /Michel Dion --New Organizational Structures: A Chance for Workers or a New Mode of Control? /Jacques Delcourt --Defining Forces in Work Attitudes: Cultural Values and Economic Environment /Eduardo S. Paderon and Charles F. O'Donnell --The Growing Dilemma of Loyalty to the Firm /John C. SJ. Haughey --Section III /Samuel M. Natale, Brian M. Rothschild, Joseph W. Sora, and Tara M. Madden --Values/Work/Education: Definitions and Context /Lee J. Richmond --Six Questions for Ethical Educational Management /Michael Bottery --Values Education: A More Effective Route to Managerial Competence? /W. M. Robb --The Educative Dimensions of Workplace Democracy /W.J. Toth --Influences on the Value-Mediating Work of Educational Leaders /K.D. Walker --Personal and Social Education in Vocational Preparation /Richard Pring --Contributors /Samuel M. Natale, Brian M. Rothschild, Joseph W. Sora, and Tara M. Madden --Index /Samuel M. Natale, Brian M. Rothschild, Joseph W. Sora, and Tara M. Madden --VIBS /Samuel M. Natale, Brian M. Rothschild, Joseph W. Sora, and Tara M. Madden. (shrink)

This essay focuses on three primary issues i. The conceptual resources offered by Spinoza to challenge the idealism and perfectionism underpinning much educational theory and dominant educational imaginaries; ii. His descriptions of a non-ideal, practical and systematic approach to developing understanding that could be applied to educational theorising and practice; and iii. The potential for a different vision of education premised upon understanding the human as simply a part of nature. Decentring the human and treating affective and mental life as (...) one would lines, planes, and bodies, as Spinoza claims we must in Ethics, invites another way of thinking about the politics and ethics of educational practice. Enacting experimental approaches to pedagogy produces new subjectivities and also invents new connections and relations between different bodies and different ideas. I argue that a properly Spinozist understanding of education would require it to be understood through practices of experimentation, in short, developing capabilities to compose relations in such a way that one also develops a the awareness of oneself as finite, dependent, vulnerable and as a part of nature. Seemingly paradoxically then, having understood how and that one is determined, and which bodies agree or disagree with one, one becomes more capable of agency and thus an ethical life. (shrink)

Over the last decade, there has been a considerable expansion of mindfulness programmes into a number of different domains of contemporary life, such as corporations, schools, hospitals and even the military. Understanding the reasons for this phenomenon involves, I argue, reflecting upon the nature of contemporary capitalism and mapping the complexity of navigating new digital technologies that make multiple and accelerated solicitations upon attention and our affective lives. Whilst acknowledging the benefits of mindfulness practice, this article argues that it is (...) equally important to attend to the ethical framework that gives orientation to these practices and the outer conditions that shape lived daily experience, such as school or work environments. I suggest that the well-meaning efforts to secularise mindfulness, provide scientific evidence for its effectiveness, and introduce it to wider publics may have served to impoverish the rich contribution that practices of mindfulness, situated within a broader ethical framework, can make to human lives, and arguably contribute to the educational endeavour. For example, the emphasis on transforming inner conditions of students’ lives can lead to the neglect of outer conditions, such as structural inequality, or unhealthy and exploitative work practices. This can result in practices that privilege individual wellbeing over compassion and concern for the happiness of others, providing a buffer against loving attention to the world and others. Instead, I ask how mindfulness in educational settings could come to be viewed in a different light if we reflect upon the ways in which school environments and curricula can promote mindfulness, awareness, sensitive inquiry, and contemplative practices through the day, rather than offering it as a discrete intervention focused on the self and wellbeing. (shrink)

In this article, Aislinn O'Donnell offers a set of reflections on the relation between therapy and education. In the first section, she examines criticisms of therapeutic education, mobilizing the example of prison education to highlight the difficulties that arise from imposing prescriptive modes of subjectification and socialization in pedagogy. In the second section, she addresses the relation between therapy and education by focusing on just one element of the experience of education: those moments at which a subject has the potential (...) of becoming significant in the life of a student. An important dimension of the educator's authority involves noticing such moments, fostering the conditions that make them more likely, and engaging in the creative process and practice of deciding how best pedagogically to respond to these moments. In the third section, O'Donnell develops this idea by detailing a philosophical approach and practice that understands “effectiveness” in education as bound to practice, creative responsiveness, and the judgment of the educator in concrete, singular pedagogical situations, rather than construed in terms of generic models of “best practice.”. (shrink)

Aenesidemus, the (re-)founder of Pyrrhonian skepticism, is usually said to have begun his career by breaking away from the Academy. This assertion rests on the word “συναιρεσιώτῃ” as it appears in Photius’ summary of Aenesidemus’ Pyrrhonian Discourses. I argue that Photius’ probable understanding of the Academy’s history undermines this traditional reading. I then examine the evidence external to Photius and conclude that it also speaks against the traditional narrative.

Pessimists hold that human life is fundamentally a condition of suffering which cannot attain transcendent meaning. According to pessimistic nihilism, life’s lack of transcendent meaning gives us reason to regret our existence. Life-affirming nihilism insists that we can and should affirm life in the absence of transcendent meaning. Yet both of these strains struggle to articulate what practical reasons might compel us to regret or affirm our inability to transcend the immanent conditions of the human predicament in the first place. (...) I suggest that we catch sight of these practical reasons when we shift our attention from the value of transcendent meaning to the desire for temporal transcendence expressed by strong attachments such aslove and devotion. In short, we want the things we love to last forever, and they can’t. This makes human life tragic, but it does not settle the question of what sort of meaning it might have or lack. (shrink)

Reconnaissant que la foi en Dieu Créateur est un mystère qui transcende notre pouvoir de compréhension humaine et de mise en concepts, l'auteur met en oeuvre divers modèles théologiques pour jeter quelque lumière sur la richesse de cette croyance. En ce qui concerne le modèle ontologique, il a recours à la théologie de Karl Rahner pour explorer le sens de l'être-créature. De par sa constitution ontologique l'être humain est à la fois différent et dépendant de Dieu en tout acte. Le (...) modèle «fiduciaire» favorisé par les Réformateurs, insiste sur le fait que la foi en Dieu Créateur est réellement un acte de confiance en l'attention que Dieu nous porte. Le modèle eschatologique, proposé par des penseurs tels Moltmann et Pannenberg, met l'accent sur Dieu comme notre futur absolu et l'objet de nos plus profonds désirs. L'article examine également certains modèles écologiques courants ainsi que l'«ecoféminisme» qui soulignent le besoin d'une intendance de la création plutôt que d'une domination. Un modèle de domination conduit à la violation de la terre comme à l'exploitation de la femme. L'article se préoccupe principalement de montrer que la foi en Dieu Créateur dans le Nouveau Testament est toujours liée au Christ comme Nouvelle Création. L'intention divine en créant était de conduire les créatures à partager la filiation du Christ. Les créatures deviennent imago Dei en vivant la relation filiale du Christ vis-à-vis du Père. Ignace de. (shrink)

Key to Rahner's understanding of Easter is his linking faith in the resurrection with anthropology. The human person is transcendence, always moving beyond self to the ever-greater God. The subject therefore seeks a definitive realization of freedom, and this realization must be bodily, since the human person is spirit-in-matter. Rahner makes an original point about the credibility of the resurrection, in that our human hope, under the influence of grace, enables us to open ourselves to the truth of Christ's resurrection. (...) Another original point of Rahner's theology is that he can accept either the theory of an intermediate state between death and final resurrection, or a resurrection which is simultaneous with death. According to Rahner, the virtue of hope functions as the link between faith and love, enabling the subject to project himself into God's future. (shrink)

In this introduction I closely read Marquand’s arguments in “On Scientific Method in the Study of Art” both in relation to their sources and in relation to Marquand’s own subsequent scholarship. My thesis is that Charles Sanders Peirce’s writing is the most conspicuous and important inspiration for the essay; however I also contend that Marquand’s handwritten corrections to the surviving manuscript of the text reveal a struggle with Peirce’s ideas that can – especially in light of Marquand’s later writing – (...) be read to expose an ambivalent or potentially even critical attitude toward central aspects of Peirce’s thought. I conclude by noting that Marquand’s intellectual relationship with Peirce speaks to both the past, present, and future of art historical scholarship. (shrink)

The ramified legacy of Bernard Berenson’s writings within 20th century art historiography is both celebrated and maligned. In an effort to help reconcile this situation, this essay argues for the partial validity of Berenson’s peculiar version of art historical formalism by detailing its historical connections to the Pragmatist philosophy and psychology of William James and by analytically correlating Berenson’s arguments with recent work in aesthetics and the philosophy of perception. The essay examines the specific example of Berenson’s analysis of Giotto’s (...) paintings and leverages a Pragmatist interpretation of Berenson’s writings to frame Berenson’s known connections with other writers: including Adolf Hildebrand, Giovanni Morelli, and Walter Pater. In conclusion, the failure, potential, reception, and legacy of Berenson’s art historical scholarship are assessed in relation to Pragmatist ideas. Der vielfältige Einfluss von Bernard Berensons Schriften auf die Kunstgeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts wird ebenso geschätzt wie verachtet. In dem Bestreben, diese Divergenzen zu berichtigen, versucht dieser Beitrag den Nachweis für die bedingte Gültigkeit von Berensons eigentümlicher Variante eines kunsthistorischen Formalismus zu erbringen, indem er einerseits seine historischen Verbindungen zur pragmatischen Philosophie und Psychologie von William James aufzeigt und indem er andererseits Berensons Argumentation ins Verhältnis zu aktuellen Debatten der wahrnehmungstheoretischen Ästhetik und Philosophie setzt. Am Beispiel von Berensons Interpretation der Gemälde Giottos führt dieser Essay eine pragmatische Analyse von Berensons Schriften durch und stellt diese ins Umfeld seiner Kontakte zu anderen Autoren: darunter Adolf Hildebrand, Giovanni Morelli und Walter Pater. Schließlich soll das Scheitern, das Potenzial, die Rezeption und das Erbe von Berensons kunsthistorischen Studien unter pragmatischen Gesichtspunkten bewertet werden. (shrink)

Depue & Morrone-Strupinsky (D&M-S) present a thorough case for the role of “reward” brain circuits in affiliative bonding. Integration of information in the nucleus accumbens shell (NA), the role of dopamine in this processing, and opioid (primarily via mu receptors) control of these circuits are the primary elements of the model. Although the overall picture is quite compelling, the description leans excessively in the view of dopamine systems as “reward” circuits.

The title of this congress begins with the word “identity”. It also includes the word “reciprocity,” which indicates a form of relationship and finally, “gift of self”. This would lead us to conclude that the identity of the human person has something to do with reciprocity and that reciprocity involves giving of oneself to others. This talk will attempt to shed light on how the concept of gender might in some way be incorporated into these three concepts. Defining what constitutes (...) the identity of the human person has been explored, and attempts to define it have been made by every major theorist in the field of psychology. At a previous Psychology and Communion congress one of the talks spoke of loving and being loved in return as the basic foundation of human identity. In that presentation we find the following observation: “The identity of the human person can be compared to the identity of a book: we know where and when it was printed; but the author is certainly not the publishing house, nor is the typesetter who prepared the text…The same is true for us human beings: we know the time and date of birth. But who is author?”. We ask ourselves, therefore: what lies at the core of the identity of this being who is born at a certain time on a certain date? Before proceeding, I think it is important to note that the basic idea regarding the identity of the human person, as we have defined and understood it from the inception of psychology and communion and explored in previous encounters, remains unchanged. I will use a quote of Chiara Lubich here that perhaps many of you know but which can serve the purpose of laying the foundation for what follows: Human beings are “ all equal but distinct. To each person [God] gave his own beauty so that they would be desirable and lovable by others; and so that in love they would be recomposed into the One who had created them with his Light, which is Himself.” Now we ask ourselves: What exactly is this “beauty” that Chiara is speaking of? What are the components, if you will, of our identity that makes us “… desirable and lovable by others…”? (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this article the Irish harp tradition is re-configured as a space consisting of visual and sonic dimensions. The visual dimension of the Irish harp space incorporates the employment of the instrument in contemporary iconography; the sonic dimension includes the employment of the instrument as a metaphor in contemporary literature and songs. By employing Bloch’s concept of surplus and tracing the path of the Irish harp from its earliest employment in Christian iconography, its prominence as an icon of colonial (...) and Ascendancy rule, and finally its utilisation as an utopian tool to inspire members of the Volunteer and United Irish movements in the late eighteenth century, I identify how the accumulation of centuries of utopian surplus resulted in the creation of an utopian icon that had the capacity to inspire a generation of Irish men and women to critique the prevailing social and political order in the eighteenth century. (shrink)

In 1886, Nietzsche wrote: ‘I am still waiting for a philosophical doctor in the extraordinary sense of the term’: a doctor who pursues not truth, but an exceptional kind of health. Nietzsche's will to health, his theory of drive organisation, and his insistence that the philosopher put himself at risk, all work together in his overall project, which consists of taking up the very role of the highly revalued physician for whom he is waiting. Deleuze and Guattari engage this same (...) task of a revalued doctoring in the Capitalisme et Schizophrénie books, attacking the disease of oedipality and providing instructions for the deorganisation of the organism as self-cure. Offering tips on this radical treatment, they employ the figure of the hypochondriac to show how it can fail. Both Nietzsche and Deleuze and Guattari perform a revaluation of health as a condition of chronic critique, a condition that wraps itself around illness to keep itself critical. (shrink)

The article addresses the implications of Prevent and Channel for epistemic justice. The first section outlines the background of Prevent. It draws upon Moira Gatens and Genevieve Lloyd’s concept of the collective imaginary, alongside Lorraine Code’s concept of epistemologies of mastery, in order to outline some of the images and imaginaries that inform and orient contemporary counter-terrorist preventative initiatives, in particular those affecting education. Of interest here is the way in which vulnerability is conceptualised in Prevent and Channel, in particular (...) the way in which those deemed ‘at risk of radicalisation’ are constituted as vulnerable and requiring intervention. The imaginary underpinning such preventative initiatives is, I argue, a therapeutic/epidemiological one. If attention is paid to the language associated with these interventions, one finds reference to terms such as contagion, immunity, resilience, grooming, virus, susceptibility, therapy, autonomy, vulnerability and risk—a constellation of images/concepts resonant with therapeutic and epidemiological theories and practices. I outline some of the implications of this therapeutic/epidemiological imaginary for epistemic injustice. If people, in this case, students, teachers and parents, feel that their voice will not be given credence, this leads to testimonial injustice. If one group is constituted as a suspect community, this risks hermeneutical injustice for that group—a situation facing Muslims at present. Given the requirements for educators and educational institutions to enact this particular iteration of preventative counter-terrorist legislation, the way in which vulnerability is understood and operationalised has direct bearing upon education and the educational experience of all stakeholders, in particular in relation to the conditions for epistemic justice. (shrink)

The growing scope of gamete donation and themanipulation of gametes makes it essential to developa coherent theory of the nature of gametes and theclaims which may be made in relation to them. Thenature of gametes is ambiguous, they blur thedistinctions between persons and property, but thecurrent legal framework which governs gamete donationand manipulation fails to address their status. Thisleaves unanswered fundamentally important questionsabout control of processes involving gametes andrights to use or control the gametes themselves andthe information which they represent. (...) These areclaims which are rooted in the concept ofproperty. A property based analysis highlights thethemes of autonomy, personhood and control which lieat the heart of the claims made in relation to gametesand an account based on the notion of property forpersonhood offers a more coherent justification forrecognising claims in gametes and mediating disputes. This perspective exposes the inadequacies andinconsistencies of the legal construction of gametesand the legal regulation of gamete donation. Thepresent legal framework has not sought to develop acoherent construction of gametes, but to constrain thepractices of the assisted reproductive technologies(including gamete donation) within a framework whichis presented as least damaging to the traditionalideologies of the creation of the family. (shrink)